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Globalisation, Accounting and Developing Countries 
Abstract 
Accounting is an instrument and an object in globalisation but its impact and 
manifestation is not uniform across Northern developed countries and Southern developing 
countries (DCs). This paper reviews contributions on globalisation and its influence on 
accounting in DCs, and identifies important research gaps. It examines the role of accounting 
in changing development policies, from state capitalism through neo-liberal market-based to 
good-governance policies. It then considers specific accounting issues, namely the diffusion 
of International Accounting Standards (now International Financial Reporting Standards) and 
how they promote global neo-liberalism; the development of the accounting profession in 
DCs in the face of competition from Northern global accounting firms and professional 
associations; accounting issues in state-owned organisations, and privatised and multinational 
corporations; government accounting reforms and the resurrection of the state in DCs; social 
and environmental accounting issues; and the rise of non-governmental organisations and 
their accounting and accountability. The discussion and conclusions reflect on achievements 
to date and important areas requiring further development. 
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1. Introduction 
Accounting may seem peripheral to development, which could explain the lack of attention 
it has received from development studies and accounting researchers, indigenous politicians 
with more pressing matters on hand and, to a lesser degree, institutions providing aid and 
finance to developing countries (DCs). Better accounting will not solve poverty but it is an 
essential, if neglected, cog in development mechanisms. Too often it is seen as a simple 
transference of technical systems, regulations, and concepts used in rich countries to poor 
ones. This masks a series of issues including their bias to Northern ideologies and interests, 
not least those of multi-national corporations (MNCs);1 insufficient recognition of indigenous 
circumstances, needs and participation; implementation problems; inequities of power; and 
an orientation to financial over development ends. Hence many accounting policies 
recommended and/or imposed by external institutions fail (Andrews, 2012). Too often the 
yardstick is whether DCs have adopted international accounting and auditing standards and 
allegedly best (i.e. Northern)2 practices, and failures to conform are attributed to cultural 
differences.  
Despite work on accounting and development in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. Enthoven, 
1973) this topic became neglected. Socially- and politically-oriented accounting journals 
published little on DCs until the 1990s, e.g. Critical Perspectives on Accounting’s first such 
paper was Asechemie (1997). He argued that agency theory, with its capitalist assumptions, 
failed to reflect accounting and labour processes in Africa. This brought a sharp rejoinder 
from Wallace (1997), a major pioneer of accounting and development research, who 
concurred that most contemporary Northern accounting theories are irrelevant to Africa. 
Subsequently, accounting research on globalisation and development increased. It often 
views globalisation negatively, expressing concerns that many reforms fail or have limited 
success, and that the voices, interests and needs of DCs are subservient to powerful Northern 
institutions’ interests and hegemony; for instance, Esposito et al. (1998) and DiFazio (1998) 
claim that although globalisation could raise living standards, it has contributed to hollowed-
out welfare states, growing unemployment, and repressive employment conditions. Lehman 
(2009) argues that deregulation, outsourcing and privatisation are heralded because they 
                                                          
1 For ease of presentation transnational corporations are included under the acronym MNC. 
2 The dichotomy between rich and poor countries is useful for analysis but it is crude and neglects gradations of 
affluence. The division is often labelled through the terms First World and Third World, Western and non-
Western, and the North and South. For ease of exposition this paper uses the latter terms. 
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facilitate global markets but neglect values that bind societies together. Samuel and 
Manassian (2011) dismiss much international accounting research as a discursive exercise 
following decolonisation that continues to propagate ‘Cold War’ development doctrines and 
political programmes for a commodity-intensive world peopled by economic subjects.  
Nevertheless, blanket condemnation of globalisation and accounting’s role therein can 
occlude positive achievements and potential advantages of better integrating DCs into the 
global economy. Furthermore, there is a danger of ‘ghettoising’ development to poor 
countries although in many rich countries, income differentials and poverty are in fact 
increasing. Too often development policies implicitly assume that DCs should learn from rich 
countries but the converse can be true - e.g. micro-finance may help poor and marginalised 
sectors of society to be more politically engaged, and development aims such as empowering 
women, redistributing income, and creating jobs for the poor are, or should be, policy 
considerations in rich countries too. 
Consequently, the paper identifies key characteristics of DCs and globalisation, and 
how globalisation (an unavoidable world scale phenomenon, see Wolf, 2003) is pertinent to 
accounting in DCs. Then it examines the role of accounting in changing development 
policies, ranging from state capitalism through neo-liberal market-based to good-governance 
policies. Next, it examines related accounting issues affecting DCs, namely the diffusion of 
International Accounting Standards (IASs) (now International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRSs) and their role in promoting global neo-liberalism; the development of the accounting 
profession in the face of competition from Northern global accounting firms and professional 
associations; accounting issues regarding privatised and state-owned organisations (SOEs), 
and MNCs; government accounting reforms; social and environmental accounting issues; and 
the rise of NGOs and concerns about their accounting and accountability. The discussion and 
conclusions reflect on achievements to date, theoretical perspectives employed and important 
areas for further development.  
 
2. Developing countries  
Defining a DC is fraught with difficulty. The World Bank (WB) uses Gross National 
Income criteria to categorise economies along four development stages: (a) low income ($905 
or less), (b) lower middle income ($906 - $3,595), (c) upper middle income ($3,596 - $11,115) 
and (d) high income ($11,116 or more). This is a useful and objective measure but it has 
problems. A mean (or a median) may disguise wide income disparity within a country, e.g. in 
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oil-rich countries like Nigeria, produce a static analysis, and inadvertently bias findings 
towards problematic ‘failing’ states. WB indices are cruder than those of the United Nations 
(UN). The WB human development index (HDI) measures life expectancy, educational 
attainment and adjusted real income ($ per person). It classifies economies into less 
developed countries (LDCs) (50), developing economies (168), economies in transition (20) 
and developed economies (42). This paper focuses on the first category of the HDI index but, 
where relevant, it includes data from other countries. Ex-communist countries in transition 
are excluded3 as they are often relatively affluent, may lie within Northern political and 
economic systems, and have a legacy of Northern institutions under revival. Nevertheless, 
like rich countries, accounting and development issues in DCs are relevant to them. 
Globalisation impacts on DCs, where 80% of the world’s population live (more than 
seven billion people). Many subsist on less than $10 a day; nearly one half on less than $2.50 
a day; and more than 1.4 billion on less than $1.25. Worldwide, 870 million people have 
insufficient food according to UNICEF, and 22,000 children die every day due to poverty.4 
Economic poverty, hunger, high mortality rates, unsafe water supplies, poor education 
systems, corrupt governments, war, and poor sanitation constrain development. Direct aid - 
i.e. cash and provisions - can alleviate such problems: a starving person cannot be more 
productive without greater sustenance; immediate relief is essential for natural and 
humankind-induced disasters; and often there is insufficient capital for infrastructure 
improvements such as digging wells. However, direct aid can only be a limited, temporary 
solution. If sustained it can create dependency; for example, refugees refusing to return home 
when safe for fear that access to food and services may be more uncertain or limited than in 
camps. Longer-run development must be sustainable; e.g. donations of mechanised boats for 
fishermen can be abandoned due to insufficient resources or expertise to maintain them. 
Direct aid may simply treat the symptoms rather than the causes of poverty; e.g. lack of 
natural resources and capital, unstable and/or ineffective governments, poor infrastructure 
such as transport and communications, inadequate education and expertise, corruption, 
barriers to trade, and dependence on foreign governments and/or businesses. Moreover, 
development is not restricted merely to economic growth but extends to improving literacy, 
                                                          
3 See special issue of Management Accounting Research (2002, V.13, N.4) and Research on Accounting in 
Emerging Economies (supplement 2, 2014) for relevant work. 
4 These statistics are taken from https://www.dosomething.org/facts/11-facts-about-global-poverty, 27/05/2014 
derived from secondary sources, namely Global Issues, Statistic Brain, One, and World Food Programme. 
Debates over estimates exist but few query their basic tenor. They tally with WB estimates. 
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life expectancy, employment, governance, and reducing environmental degradation. These 
issues require accounting that goes beyond its traditional remit.  
 
3. Globalisation 
Accounting papers frequently refer to globalisation without defining it or considering its 
political and socio-economic ramifications, particularly for DCs (Poullaos, 2004). 
Globalisation first entered an American English dictionary in 1961 (Scholte, 2002), although 
the concept was used much earlier (Nissanke & Thorbecke, 2006; Robertson, 1990). 
Subsequently, it has entered vernaculars across disciplines, and political and lay discourses. 
A constant theme of development policies, whatever their ideological hue, is how best to 
facilitate sustainable development and integrate poor countries into an increasingly globalised 
economy. Yet the definition of globalisation remains elusive - writers define it depending on 
their perspective, whether sociological-, economic-, political-, scientific-, or management-
/business-oriented (Guillen, 2001).  
This paper defines globalisation broadly, as in economic geography, where it is associated 
with the growing mobility of goods, services, commodities, information, people and 
communications across national frontiers. It is most pronounced in banking and finance 
where information technology, global stock markets, futures, debt, derivatives, and interest 
rate swaps have accelerated the mobility of factors of production (Harvey, 1989;  Lash & 
Urry, 1994). Neo-liberal economists see globalisation as the “integration of markets for goods, 
services and factors of production” (Wolf, 2003, p. 393), and “the integration of national 
economies and the development of international markets” (Bordo et al., 1999:1). This 
presumes that increased flows of trade, capital, labour, and technology across national 
borders as well as accelerated transport and telecommunications developments create a 
competitive environment conducive to faster economic growth, allow laws of comparative 
advantage to operate (Goldin &Van der Mensbrugghe, 1992; Nissanke &Thorbecke, 2006; 
Wolf, 2003), and will shift the level of incomes in DCs towards those of richer countries 
(Sachs & Warner, 1995). For example, an OECD study claimed that full trade openness 
would produce by 2002 an annual gain of US$477 billion (in 1992 prices) of which US$221 
billion would accrue to DCs (Goldin &Van der Mensbrugghe, 1992). However, although 
Northern countries espouse free trade, they can still place-restrict it; for example, although 
technological advances foster the global transmission of knowledge and spawn new 
producers of technology (Wolf, 2003), many DCs do not reap many of its benefits:  rich 
countries’ patent and copyright systems restrict DCs’ access (Chang, 2007). 
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Sometimes economic, political and cultural features of globalisation are conflated. 
Economic imperatives such as  ‘the deregulation of international capital flows and trade’, ‘a 
globally integrated economy’, and ‘globally integrated markets’ stand alongside political 
ones such as ‘global forms of governance’ and ‘the world-as-a-whole’ (Bordo et al., 1999; 
Martens & Raza, 2010; Robertson, 1990; Wolf, 2003). This recognises overlaps between 
globalisation, governance and international relations (Scholte, 2002), and that globalisation is 
not merely an economic phenomenon but also covers “technological developments, cultural 
exchanges, facilitated by … freer trade [and] … tourism and immigration, changes in the 
political landscape and ecological consequences” (Martens & Raza, 2010, p.280). Economic 
globalisation and culture are “increasingly strategic issue[s] that has to be faced and properly 
managed” (Granell, 2000, p.90). A worry is that a neo-liberal approach reduces cultural 
issues to economic incentives, and imbues a market-oriented mentality that precludes 
alternative ways of thinking and imagining (McGuigan, 2005, p.229). For example, global 
marketing of products the American way (e.g. Hollywood) may push indigenous and national 
cultures (Kapur, 1997) towards a homogenised Northern culture (Everett, 2003).  
Globalisation, however, is not inevitably driven by technological innovations, markets, 
and socio-political forces, as often depicted in popular writings, but is partly an outcome of 
policies from major global economy regulators, of which the Bretton Woods institutions -WB, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) - are the 
most important (Kapur, 1997). Each has a different mission (the WTO - fostering trade; the 
IMF - maximising financial stability, and the WB - promoting development) although 
demarcation between their activities can be blurred (Friedrichs & Friedrichs, 2002). 
Alongside the United Nations (UN) they form part of a complex nexus of interlocking 
transnational institutions covering banking supervision, payment and settlement systems, 
money laundering, securities commissions, corporate governance, market integrity and 
insurance supervision (Graham & Annisette, 2012). Northern powers dominate these 
institutions (Chang, 2007) and their endeavours to integrate DCs into the globalised economy 
have been accused of following an agenda of modernism and neo-liberal economics 
(Friedrichs & Friedrichs, 2002; Nissanke & Thorbecke, 2006; Scholte, 2002), and imposing 
globalisation from above non-democratically (Stiglitz, 2003). However, they are not 
omnipotent, nor are their interventions necessarily adequate and coordinated. Global 
economic regulation can exacerbate instability, leave systems prone to crises, and be 
inadequate to deal with global threats, which has brought claims that “the current process of 
globalisation is unsustainable in the long run unless we introduce new institutions and 
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policies able to govern it” (Borghesi & Vercelli, 2003, p. 87). Globalisation can be more 
complicated than anticipated (Martens & Raza, 2010) and it defies deterministic, linear, 
functionalist patterns of development (Robertson, 1990, p18).  
Criticisms tend not to be about globalisation per se - it has always existed although it 
has accelerated - but about the process(es) invoked in its name. Scholte (2002) observes that, 
“on cross-examination most ‘anti-globalization’ protesters … reject neoliberal globalization 
rather than globalization per se” (ibid. p 10). The concern is that DCs cannot control policies 
with risks and costs that are “significant for fragile developing economies and the world’s 
poor” (Nissanke & Thorbecke, 2006, p. 1338). Exposing DCs to external economic forces 
can reduce national sovereignty, render domestic macroeconomic management difficult, and 
reduce tax revenues, particularly where MNCs relocate to low tax jurisdictions or use 
international transfer pricing to their advantage. Richer economies may benefit most from 
free trade as it can render small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in DCs uncompetitive 
thereby stifling the growth of domestic firms; and it can encourage the overuse of natural 
resources, particularly when DCs have weak legal and regulatory systems, weak government 
agencies, and ineffective and sometimes corrupt political leadership. In many DCs, 
globalisation has not reduced poverty, inequality has increased, and it has had detrimental 
environmental impacts, prompting many academics, commentators and poverty reduction and 
environmental activists to seek change.  
 
4. The role of accounting in changing development policies 
4.1 State capitalism 
During the 1950s and 1960s Marxist and liberal economists prescribed different 
development policies. Marxists espoused industrialisation through state central planning, 
public ownership of major enterprises, and economic protection through tariffs and currency 
controls. In contrast, liberal economists stressed free trade, markets, capital accumulation and 
sometimes democracy. The latter had little resonance with most African and Asian 
economies that lacked capital and were predominately agricultural. Consequently, upon 
gaining independence, many adopted socialist regimes, often upon external advice but also 
due to indigenous rulers’ ideological preferences, and pragmatism given shortages of private 
capital, under-developed product markets, and limited human and physical resources. 
Parliamentary democracies were instituted but often were diminished or abolished under 
systems of presidential one-party rule or military dictatorships. However, both development 
approaches promoted economic growth and were economic, linear and modernist: local 
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tradition and culture was perceived as an impediment and its sacrifice a necessary if painful 
outcome. 
 International bodies like the WB and IMF supported state-led industrialisation. Large 
SOEs were created with boards nominated by ministers. The intention was for ministers and 
planners to set policy and for managers to execute it. The assumption was that central state 
planning would occur within a legal rational bureaucracy. The backbone of accountability 
and regulation lay in audited financial accounts to ascertain the accuracy of financial records 
and whether expenditure was disbursed as planned. These were to be fed back through 
Ministries to Parliament and potentially to the public. Iterative budgeting would coordinate 
central plans with those of SOEs; and timely and reliable accounting information would help 
ministries and SOEs allocate resources according to relative returns and development 
priorities and monitor managers’ achievements of plans. Massive state investments in 
manufacturing SOEs and infrastructure in cities followed - rural agriculture received little 
attention - despite employing 60% of the workforce.  
Initial accounting research endorsed central state planning, public ownership and 
industrialisation in DCs and recommended improving indigenous accounting capacity, data 
provision, and developing accounting education within a self-governed accounting profession 
(Enthoven, 1982; Ndzinge &Briston, 1999; Needles, 1976; Seidler, 1967; Seiler, 1966 ) 
through a sub-plan within an overall economic plan (Needles, 1976). In retrospect these 
contributions were admirable if somewhat Utopian. An exception was Ghartey (1985), who 
claimed that African governments’ monopoly of power, bureaucracy, conflicting policies, 
ineffective institutional structures, and cronyism would render accounting marginal and 
ineffective; poverty and dominant elites’ lack of motivation would stymy adoption of 
technologically advanced systems; and cultures based on extended families would bring 
corruption, malpractice; and that the ensuing uncertainty, fear, tension, and insecurity would 
produce recurring crises. In short, he counselled that effective accounting requires good 
governance.  
Some countries that successfully developed, e.g. South Korea, adopted such 
accounting changes but events transpired differently in many DCs often prone to economic, 
social and physical crises, political instability and regime changes. A recurring research finding 
is that whilst basically sound accounting and accountability systems were often adopted and 
maintained, in actuality they played a ceremonial role to gain legitimacy from the populace and 
external funders, and played little part in ministerial and parliamentary scrutiny or decisions. 
Meaningful accountability often never occurred (Alam, 1997; Hoque, 1995; Hoque & Hopper, 
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1994; 1997; Uddin & Hopper, 1999). Political not legal rational bureaucratic or economic 
criteria were dominant: filling positions, awarding contracts, state sell-off of assets and operating 
decisions became subject to patronage by politicians seeking to bolster political support or to 
further their material interests. Many DCs took advantage of the ‘Cold War’ and played off 
communist and Northern donor countries to secure aid often more oriented to securing 
political allegiance than poverty alleviation (Hopper et al., 2009). State capitalism in action 
bore little correspondence to its ideals. Accounting unrelated to rewards or actual 
circumstances became irrelevant to managers in SOEs when political interventions 
predominated. Formal accounting mechanisms - usually technically sound albeit dated - 
remained intact but became rule-bound, ceremonial, irrelevant rituals. Politicians retained 
them to maintain a veneer of legal rationality to secure legitimacy from external bodies and 
the populace (van Helden & Uddin, 2016) but they and central planners paid little heed to 
accounting, setting higher but unrealistic budget targets to demonstrate political prowess. 
Dissatisfied managers either sought more budget participation and flexibility (Maunders et al., 
1990), or resisted granting undue deals on ethical and/or commercial grounds but many 
recognised their weakness, disregarded budgets, and struck informal deals with local trade 
union leaders, workers, and suppliers to maintain production, whilst manipulating budgets to 
protect their reputations. Eventually, however, politicians found their space for political 
manoeuvre increasingly constrained as ballooning SOE losses and large public sector deficits 
resulted in fiscal crises of the state. Many DCs had to turn to donors and transnational financiers 
for relief.  
 
4.2 Neo-liberal policies 
 DCs became increasingly aid-dependant and had to adopt development policies 
advocated by affluent nations (in the North), transnational financiers, particularly the WB 
and its acolytes, and often their former coloniser. The cessation of ‘Cold War’ politics 
ended benign loans for client states and right wing ideologies like Thatcherism and 
Reaganism cast scepticism on economic aid unaccompanied by structural reforms. During 
the 1980s and 1990s, external funders regarded many states in DCs as too big and corrupt, 
and a block rather than facilitators of development. The assumption was that state 
bureaucracies were inflexible, uncreative, rule-bound, and often corrupt. International 
financiers, frustrated with DC governments’ failure to deliver services to the poor, turned 
to market capitalism inspired by neo-classical economics, including agency theory, 
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transaction cost economics, and ‘Friedmanite Chicago’ neo-liberalism. Put crudely, the state 
was seen as the problem not the solution. The aim was to replace political factionalism and 
patronage with private ownership and market exchanges. Aware that fiscal crises 
precipitate political crises, LDC governments knew they must (or appear to) comply. 
 Loans to rectify fiscal imbalances of DCs became conditional on adopting ‘one-size 
fits all’ policies incorporating privatisation, deregulation, open markets, free trade, limited 
government intervention, attracting private capital, and public sector reforms within 
structural adjustment policies (SAPs) (Boli & Petrova, 2007; Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1995; 
Vreeland, 2003). The aim was to create conditions conducive for international finance 
capital and capital markets by eliminating subsidies, price controls and import barriers; 
reorganising and lessening public ownership of domestic banks; promoting private banks 
and domestic capital markets; privatising or closing SOEs; introducing ‘new public 
management’ (NPM) in government agencies; and legislating to force trade unions 
(particularly public sector ones) into collective bargaining, sever party links, and curtail 
labour rights, particularly in export zones. Private firms or non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) rather than the government were contracted to deliver services. The aspiration was 
for a smaller state to play a greater supply-side role, follow legal-rational not partisan 
decision making, and create infrastructures conducive to market capitalism. This required 
changes to improve law and order and to protect property rights; fostering financial and 
commercial mobility; education and training congruent with market needs; regulatory 
bodies, particularly for privatised utilities where monopolies prevail; and political parties 
competing to deliver such regimes.  
 Accounting is crucial to market-based reforms, although often neglected by the IMF 
and WB whose policy officers have been, until recently, predominately macroeconomists. 
They tended to assume that accounting was a technical matter. Accounting reforms usually 
followed the advice and reports of accounting professional bodies (indigenous and 
international); transnational accounting and auditing standard setters (IFAC and the 
IASB5); and the Northern accounting industry, particularly the ‘Big 46’ accounting firms 
(Hopper et al., 2009; 2012). It was presumed that increased competition and personal 
ownership in newly privatised companies, dictates of vitalised capital markets and regulators, 
company law reforms, building local professional accounting capacity and its regulation, 
                                                          
5 International Federation of Accountants (IFAC); International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 
6 Throughout this review the number of ‘Big’ accounting firms varies according to the date of relevant studies. 
We have used the number referred to by the authors, hence the variations in the paper. 
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along with international accounting and audit standards would improve internal and external 
accounting reports and auditing, and thereby better lubricate capital market transactions and 
enterprise efficiency. Within government, NPM, which promulgates private sector 
accounting, was a major focus; however, the reality was that many DCs had insufficient 
local capacity and political support to manage ambitious, ‘big-bang’ reforms (van Helden & 
Uddin, 2016).  
 Stiglitz (2002) argued that IMF ‘solutions’ worsen (even create) problems by 
unduly promoting global finance interests and creating fresh sources for neo-
patrimonialism to feed from, e.g. through sales of privatised companies and regulatory 
capture. SAPs had little success: on average, the performance of debtor country 
economies lagged behind those of the DCs without IMF loans (Welch &  Oringer, 1998); 
deregulation and suppression of trade barriers could erode tax bases (Aizenman & 
Jinjarak, 2009); wages did not converge towards those in developed countries (Rama, 
2002); labour’s share of national income declined; changes in labour institutions (such as 
eroded minimum wages and trade union powers) contributed to greater inequality (Cornia, 
1999); poverty and unemployment increased (Stiglitz, 2002); trade with developed 
countries lowered incomes (Meschi & Vivarelli, 2009); local democracy was diminished; 
MNCs benefited - e.g. sometimes by purchasing SOEs at low cost (Narula & Dunning, 
2000); and the economic growth promised failed to materialise (McMichael, 2007), 
particularly for many poorer countries pursuing export-led growth strategies (Sannassee 
et al., 2014; Sawkut et al., 2009) . This is unsurprising for, somewhat ironically, rich 
countries did not follow neo-liberal policies to develop (Chang, 2007; Goldin & Van der 
Mensbrugghe, 1992; Stiglitz, 2002).  
 From a neo-classical perspective, cheap labour is often the main competitive 
advantage of DCs but, paradoxically, rich countries maintained protectionist measures - 
such as subsidies for locally-farmed produce - in accordance with GATT and WTO rules 
governing cheap labour in DCs threatening local businesses and farms (Lowder, 1999). 
This could wreak havoc in the agricultural sector of DCs. For example, “Somalia’s 
pastoral economy was decimated by a structural adjustment programme of duty-free 
imports of subsidized beef and dairy products from the European Union” (McMichael, 
2007, p.225); in Peru IMF debt conditions brought in cheap corn imports and inflated 
prices for farm inputs which bankrupted small farmers and intensified de-peasantisation 
(Chossudovsky, 2003); and Thai agro-exporting to international food processors brought 
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short-term gains but subsequently limited income generation and food security, and 
resulted in increased volatilities for tomato producers (McMichael, 2007). 
The results of accounting reforms were often disappointing (Andrews, 2012; Hopper 
et al., 2012; van Helden & Uddin, 2016). It was not evident that adopting IASs had much 
practical effect beyond resident international firms or indigenous firms seeking foreign 
listings: auditing remained weak or corrupted; increased financial transparency and 
information did not materialise; policies, responsibilities and delivery of services became 
fragmented; accounting systems and regulations adopted to appease international agencies 
were often ignored; and civil servants suffering reductions in pay and numbers became at 
worst demoralised and more often less effective (Bakre, 2008; Chand & White, 2007; Mir & 
Rahaman, 2005).  
4.3. Good-governance policies  
Following the harsh critiques of neo-liberal policies, transnational development 
institutions and governments in rich and poor countries embraced a good governance agenda. 
It was realised that downsizing the state was an error. The WB (1992) identified governance 
quality as crucial for development, particularly the type of political regime; how authority is 
exercised when managing development resources; and its capacity to formulate and 
implement policies. Attention turned to the ‘Capable State’ and ‘Good Governance’ to 
complement market-based policies (World Bank, 1997), and many DCs committed to 
undertake such reforms voluntarily although they were often conditions for financial 
assistance (Chang, 2007).  
Definitions of a capable state and good governance are often vague and varied, partly 
because some discretion is left with local policy-makers. Definitions can focus on means not 
ends. The agenda does not abandon macro-economic market-based reforms, encouraging 
private enterprise, and integrating DCs into the global economy, but it also focuses on building 
capacity and infrastructure to strengthen state institutions; protecting the most vulnerable, 
particularly the poor and women; safeguarding natural resources and the environment; 
combatting corruption and mismanagement; improving accountability and transparency; and 
protecting civil society and human rights (World Bank, 1997). The emphasis is on social 
justice and liberties; civil society 7  involvement and influence, free and transparent 
                                                          
7 Civil society organisations include NGOs, professional and private sector associations, trade unions, families, 
churches, and neighbourhood, social and work groups. 
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information, press freedom, and rights to voluntary association. Undemocratic tendencies and 
poor government are seen as liabilities. The traditional economic approach to development 
has been re-cast in the shape of social or civic imperatives, e.g. improving ‘governance’ in 
rural settings; microfinance to empower the grassroots; and social entrepreneurship 
(Alawattage et al., 2015). Reforms often incorporate decentralisation to local governments 
and communities, e.g. through village development committees, commune accountability 
boards, and citizen complaint procedures. To increase the capacity of states, more donor 
funding has been directly placed into government coffers rather than to specific projects and 
delivery agencies. This has brought increased emphasis on securing better motivated, trained 
and remunerated civil servants who are more accountable and responsive to other stakeholders 
and comply with bureaucratic rules and regulations; meritocratic recruitment and promotion; 
and performance appraisal to develop a workforce of the right size, skills mix, motivation, 
and professional ethos, and sound government accounting systems supported by a robust 
accounting profession (Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010). 
 This must be seen in the context of the Millennium Development Goals established 
by UN members and 23 international organisations in 2000 for achievement by 2015. The 
goals were to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; 
promote gender equality; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a 
global partnership for development. Each has specific targets and dates for its achievement. 
WB Worldwide Governance Indicators monitor 215 economies across six governance 
dimensions: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government 
effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. Each indicator can be 
broken down by country and topic. 8  Considerable progress has been achieved, albeit 
unevenly. 
Critics allege that good-governance policies are symbolic, subtle gestures that fail to 
address the substance of failed market reforms (Chang, 2007), and that democratic progress 
is often minimal due to donors’ mixed commitment (Lynch &Crawford, 2011). Nevertheless, 
such policies illustrate how the criteria and means of accounting for development extend into 
the social and political, and beyond economic growth and rising average incomes. Although 
conventional Northern accountability and accounting systems are still widely recommended, 
                                                          
8 The topics are agriculture and rural development; aid effectiveness; climate change; economy and growth; 
education; health; infrastructure; energy and mining; poverty; gender; environment; private and public sectors; 
external debt; financial sector; science and technology; social development; social protection and labour; trade; 
and urban development. 
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ideally these should incorporate greater democracy, civil society empowerment, 
decentralisation to local levels, transparency; and promote sustainability, poverty reduction and 
human rights. Whether this will occur is problematic. 
 
5 Contemporary issues in accounting and development 
5.1 International Accounting Standards, transnational institutions and the promotion of 
global neo-liberalism  
The WB’s Framework for International Financial Architecture (World Bank, 2001; 
2005) seeks global standardisation through the adoption by governments of international 
accounting and auditing standards, modified accounting regulations for SMEs, better human 
resources to implement standards, and better public oversight of auditing (Graham & 
Annisette, 2012). In so doing, Northern governments and transnational financial institutions 
still promote neo-liberal Anglo-American accounting. For example, they attributed the 1997-8 
East Asian crisis to crony capitalism, poor financial governance, and insufficient 
transparency and they pressured DCs to align their financial infrastructures with international 
best practices. US Treasury Department officials argued that accounting harmonisation would 
increase global financial integration and extend Northern capital markets to DCs. Critics 
argue that this ‘financialises’ the world economy in the image of Anglo-American, finance-
led capitalism, and that such policies are inappropriate for a ‘socially responsible’ institution 
like the WB (Saravanamuthu, 2004), although Annisette (2004) claimed that was a naive 
interpretation, for it neglects the financial and institutional pressures driving the WB’s pursuit 
of private international capital.  
The WB and IMF rely on Northern professional accounting associations, ‘Big 4’ 
accounting firms, and transnational regulation and standard-setting agencies, particularly the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) for the technical detail within their general accounting 
recommendations. This has shifted the professional identity of standard setters towards 
satisfying transnational regulators and world governance institutions rather than national 
accounting regulation (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006, in Power, 2010). Botzem (2014) 
argues that the IASB is now the primary influence on global accounting although 
Samsonova-Taddei and Humphrey (2014) argue that national associations are still prominent 
and need strengthening to counter dominant Northern ‘Big 4’ accounting firms and 
professional associations. 
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 The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), founded in 1973, was 
originally a voluntary committee founded and funded by Northern professional associations 
inclined to traditional trusteeship who assumed they were the most appropriate agents to 
govern accountancy through issuing IASs. The IASC gained 140 member bodies from 104 
countries, including many DCs. The IASB replaced it in 2001, following pressure from 
capital market authorities, particularly the US Stock Exchange Council (SEC) and the 
International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO), who wanted international 
standardisation to serve investors’ needs. The IASB remains responsible for developing IASs 
and promoting their application. It is a private company: its board members are employees of 
a foundation funded by corporations, and some seats are designated for ‘Big Four’ accounting 
firms which are over-represented (Suddaby et al., 2007). Thus, its experts draw from the 
major accounting firms they police (Cobham & McNair, 2012). Most trustees are from North 
America and Europe, as are eight of the 14 IASB members - representatives from DCs are 
minimal (Perera, 2012). The IASB’s structure and membership has prompted questions about 
its legitimacy to set standards, the constituencies it serves, asymmetries of power, and the 
efficacy of standards adopted (Cobham & McNair, 2012).  
DCs’ reaction to IASs has been diverse. Syrian accountants perceived globalisation 
and AISs as Anglo-American and imperialistic, a threat to the Syrian accounting profession 
and local jobs, and they anticipated problems in adopting and enforcing IASs without better 
training, but they believed globalisation could better their lives and the profession (Gallhofer 
et al., 2011). Elsewhere, studies suggest that universal standards usher in global capitalism 
with adverse consequences for DCs (Briston, 1978; Perera, 1989). For example, whilst capital 
markets welcomed China’s adoption of the fair value accounting (FVA) it did little to 
advance the public interest or challenge political and economic forces in China (Zhang et al., 
2012). South Pacific Islands had insufficient resources, skills and connections to capital 
markets to harmonise accounting practices (Chand, 2005). Fiji adopted IFRSs 9  when 
influential MNCs and large international accounting firms claimed they would improve 
accounting’s ‘relevance’ and ‘accountability’ but they mainly helped transfer economic 
resources to IFRS’s proponents (Chand & White, 2007). Whilst Boolaky (2012) argued that 
Mauritius has a socio-political and economic context which was conducive to IFRS 
development compared to many African countries, Northern standards and practices 
espoused neutrality and rational calculation which masked international capital flows in the 
                                                          
9 The IASB’s name for global accounting standards, previously called IASs by the IASC. 
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case of Jamaica (Bakre, 2008). In Bangladesh, transnational institutions pressured the 
government and local accounting associations to adopt IASs to encourage foreign direct 
investment (FDI) but the slight local involvement brought poor adoption levels and domestic 
conflicts (Mir &  Rahaman, 2005). IFRS adoption by DCs is often advocated to attract FDI, 
but cross-country studies reveal conflicting evidence. For example, whilst a large-scale study 
of 124 countries found that FDI was positively associated with IFRS adoption (Gordon et al., 
2012), Nnadi & Soobaroyen (2015) found the opposite to be the case in Africa. 
DCs often lack the technical expertise and influence to formulate IASs. Sadly, the 
IASB’s consultation procedures have been labelled a legitimation strategy (Botzem, 2014). 
Even the WB has called upon the IASB to pay more attention to DCs, SMEs, and financial 
services to the poor; and the 2009 and 2010 G20 summits asked the IASB to improve the 
involvement of DCs, make standards more relevant for them, and increase access to financial 
services for the poor (Fyson, 2012). Critics of the IASB accuse it of neglecting Southern 
countries’ concerns about intra-company trade, transfer pricing, global consolidation, cross-
border invoicing, tax confidentiality, disclosing offenders, and low penalties for tax 
transgressions (Cobham & McNair, 2012). UN members from DCs have not used their 
majority to challenge the international accounting regulation agendas of (minority) Northern 
nations (Rahman, 1998); however, regional alliances of accounting associations have grown, 
often involving DCs, such as the Pan African Federation of Accountants formed in 2011 with 
WB encouragement, the International Federation of Francophone Accountants formed in 
1981, and the South Asian Federation of Accountants formed in 1984. Inter alia, they profess 
to help DCs make their case in processes of global harmonisation. 
 Perera (2012) divides the problems that DCs face when adopting IFRSs between 
general convergence issues and challenges to specific DCs. Convergence problems include 
nationalism; resentment of foreign influence; difficulties of gaining consensus; no universal 
acceptance of the need for such standards; their lack of differentiation to suit each DC’s 
needs; naïve assumptions that they will produce comparable reports; the costs to family-
owned indigenous businesses; and cultural differences, particularly when there is uncertainty 
over applications and different ethical values. Problems in specific DCs include difficulties in 
exerting professional judgement within a principles approach; inadequate qualified and 
experienced accountants and regulators; no established accountancy profession; reconciling 
standards with national economic planning; insufficient government involvement; and weak 
legal systems. When Andrews (2013) examined 20 IMF and WB Accounting and Auditing 
Reports of Standards and Codes in Africa since 2003, he found that their Northern-centric 
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prescriptions neglected local needs, cultural differences and context, were too complex, and 
met the needs of capital markets and business rather than those of the state and central 
planners. Failure to satisfactorily address such issues means that IASs are adopted but not 
enforced (Fyson, 2012). Nevertheless, donors and the WB still assess accounting progress in 
DCs by their legal adoption of international accounting and auditing standards; the 
accounting profession’s formal regulation of compliance; businesses’ and accountants’ 
commitment to these issues; and formal provision of accounting education and training 
(Andrews, 2013; Fyson, 2012).  
Auditing standards are the province of IFAC, a Swiss‐registered NGO, formed in 
1977 at the 11th World Congress of Accountants. It has 158 member bodies and associates in 
123 countries, representing over 2.5 million accountants (Perera, 2012). Its mission is to 
serve the public interest, and strengthen the accountancy profession worldwide through high-
quality professional auditing. The IFAC is responsible for international standards on auditing 
ethics, accounting education and training, and public sector accounting. Its emergence 
stemmed from powerful regulators, particularly the WB, the IOSCO and the European 
Commission (EC), which saw the governance of auditors as of increasing global importance. 
Arguably, its membership is more open, and it pursues the public interest, ethics, and 
Southern countries’ needs more than the IASB does. For example, following WB complaints 
of their neglect of DCs, IFAC launched the International Forum on Accountancy 
Development in 1999 to promote transparent and high-standard financial reporting by 
accounting and auditing professionals in DCs (Perera, 2012). The IFAC’s Professional 
Accountancy Organization Development Committee’s plan for 2011-2014 seeks to 
strengthen professional accountancy organisations in DCs.10 However, changes to IFAC’s 
membership and governance have increased the influence of large Northern accounting firms 
and Northern regulators, and diminished IFAC’s “public interest” commitments and global 
strategies for auditor regulation and public oversight (Humphrey et al., 2009; Loft et al., 
2006). For example, the re-emergence of self-regulation in modified regulatory partnerships 
between transnational accounting firms, public oversight boards and large national 
                                                          
10 Its current objectives are: to develop accountancy professions’ capacity to produce high-quality financial 
information and management systems that support financial stability, economic growth, and social progress; 
increase awareness and knowledge sharing on adopting and implementing international standards; and improve 
development partnerships with the international donor community, regional organisations, and public and 
private sector stakeholders.  
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accountancy bodies constrains global regulation in bank auditing, the status of auditing, and 
auditors’ ability to pursue public interest issues (Humphrey et al., 2009).  
Ultimately IFAC seeks harmonisation but their prescription of Northern auditing and 
corporate governance practices can prove inappropriate as they presume (often unwisely) that 
efficient capital markets, investor sophistication, effective regulators and legal systems 
prevail in many DCs. For example, in Bangladesh, compliance with and enforcement of 
auditing standards is weak as family-controlled firms predominate, there is easy access to 
bank credit, and auditors are poorly skilled (Siddique, 2012). DCs often adopt auditing 
standards to comply with loan conditions and gain legitimacy, although some DCs with 
strong accounting capacity and infrastructure, such as China, are challenging Northern 
domination. For example, the IASB permitted only the acquisition method of accounting for 
business combinations based on FVA but Chinese standard setters created two methods 
(Baker et al., 2010). When the FASB and the IASB prohibited the pooling of interests for 
business combinations, Chinese standard setters accepted this but perceived it as an attempt 
to make Chinese capital markets resemble those in Northern economies (Zhang et al., 2012).  
The WTO has also helped to create a global market for accounting and auditing 
services. After extensive lobbying from transnational accounting firms, industry, and the 
USA, the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services and the Disciplines on Domestic 
Regulation in the Accountancy Sector abolished domestic regulations perceived as barriers to 
trade and investment. This impaired DCs’ scope for domestic regulation on national and sub-
national licensing, accountants’ qualifications, the scope of their work, their organisation as 
businesses, and adoption of non-harmonised technical standards. This has in turn constrained 
DCs’ ability to protect their fledgling local profession, leaving large Northern accounting 
firms free to pursue their interests (Arnold, 2005; Suddaby et al., 2007). Whether this 
improves broader development goals is questionable; for example, whilst financial 
development improves asset allocation and is linked to economic growth in DCs, it may 
inhibit poverty reduction by diverting funding to large enterprises that have collateral rather 
than to smaller, poorer firms (Hossain et al., 2012).  
5.2 The Accounting Profession: developing local capacity in the face of Northern global 
accounting firms and professional associations 
Donors seeking to promote FDI and the private sector in DCs have prioritised 
stronger regulation by local accounting professionals, but accounting is increasingly 
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globalised and dominated by large accounting firms (Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 2014). 
These interested parties have convinced regulators that external audits by global firms 
generate greater trust, surveillance and regulation of international enterprises (Hanlon, 1994) 
and they actively lobbied the WTO for a global market in accounting and auditing services. 
This can marginalise national accounting qualifications and licensing. In contrast, it has 
helped Northern accounting firms to shift the boundaries of professional regulation; gain new 
national markets and customers - e.g. NGOs and transnational financial institutions (Arnold, 
2005); diffuse an Anglo-American model of universal professionalisation (Poullaos &  Uche, 
2012); and re-produce globalisation in everyday managerial practices (Barrett et al., 2005).  
Northern professional accounting associations, once primarily national, now compete 
to become global through examinations and membership in foreign countries, mutual 
recognition agreements, and partnerships with other national associations. Many have entered 
capacity-building projects in DCs, often financed by the WB. This can benefit DCs with 
weak accounting expertise and institutions, but the motives of the Northern accounting 
industry may be neither altruistic nor socially desirable (Arnold & Sikka, 2001; Power, 1994). 
Their pursuit of international harmonisation of accounting knowledge carries dangers for 
DCs (Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 2014). For example, syllabi reproduce Northern 
values, systems and priorities, but neglect issues pertinent to DCs (Poullaos, 2012). Such 
harmonisation is also lucrative and enables Northern associations to extend their membership 
and credentials, frustrate development of rival indigenous associations, exert greater 
influence upon growing independent oversight and transnational regulation, and further the 
case for globally integrated accounting and auditing standards (Samsonova-Taddei &  
Humphrey, 2014). 
Histories of accounting professionalisation11  deliver a note of caution. The South 
African accounting profession helped maintain apartheid (Catchpowle & Cooper, 1999; 
Hammond et al., 2009; 2012); and accountants assisted imperial governance and control over 
indigenous, slave and settler populations (Annisette & Neu, 2004). Few ex-colonies’ 
accounting professions are free from the legacy of empire: colonial professions and their 
members can still dominate practice, often to the exclusion of indigenous accountants 
(Poullaos & Uche, 2012; Sian, 2011). After independence, many DCs sought to establish 
national accounting bodies to redress shortages of accountants and the imperialistic 
domination by Northern accounting firms and professions. However, these initiatives mostly 
                                                          
11 For example, see the special issue Critical Perspectives on Accounting on Accounting and Empire (2004). 
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faltered due to rivalries between locally and externally credentialed accountants and 
associations [sometimes divided on ethnic lines (see Annisette, 2003)], and large Northern 
international accounting firms and associations seeking to preserve their global influence. For 
example, conflicts endured between a Malaysian accounting association supported by the 
(then) ‘Big 6’ firms and a local association supported by smaller local firms over national 
accounting standard setting (Susela, 1999). Ethiopia’s communist government made 
accountants government employees but the return to a market‐oriented economy in 1991 
brought pressures for a more autonomous accountancy profession. The Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) used its fifty-year influence over Ethiopia's 
accountancy to control the Ethiopian Professional Association of Accountants and Auditor’s 
training and certification (Mihret et al., 2012). In Trinidad and Tobago, the ACCA, which 
had dominated certifying professional accountants, collaborated with local accounting elites 
to subvert the government’s goal of indigenising accountancy training (Annisette, 2000). 
Jamaica hit similar problems involving the ACCA when attempting to establish a local 
professional body (Bakre, 2006). In 1988, the Commonwealth Caribbean chartered institutes 
agreed to create an independent regional accountancy association in the belief that foreign 
accounting education and training programmes, particularly British ones, did not serve their 
needs, but transnational accounting professional bodies and firms - particularly the ACCA - 
blocked this in order to retain their Caribbean market. Even the developing of university 
accounting education appropriate to local needs can be hampered by accounting academics 
allied to a foreign profession (Venter & De Villiers, 2013). Such events have been labelled 
manifestations of imperialism, neo-colonialism, and globalisation (Bakre, 2014). 
This, however, is not inevitable. Philippine legislators removed certified public 
accounting from Americans (Dyball et al., 2007). Expatriate British accountants dominated 
accountancy in colonial Kenya to the exclusion of African Kenyans and the marginalisation 
of Asians. After independence affirmative actions, social reforms, and new accountancy 
education and training programmes introduced by the government reversed exclusionary 
recruitment and facilitated entry of Africans, although their full acceptance and integration 
remain distant objectives (Sian, 2007). However, a governmental attempt to create a national 
accounting profession does not guarantee its independence; for example, in China, a powerful 
and ideologically-driven state strongly influences the accounting profession (Yee, 2012), and 
the state co-opted the emergent Brazilian accounting profession (1902-1946) (Agrizzi & Sian, 
2015).  
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A counterweight to the dominance of the Northern accounting industry may lie in the 
growing global alliances of national professional associations, e.g. the Global Accounting 
Alliance and the Edinburgh Group. These include many DCs’ associations - e.g. in 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan - whose aims vary. Some seek to establish a 
‘global elite’; others to grant peripheral bodies - particularly in DCs - more voice in 
transnational regulation; and some use generous WB funding to increase accounting capacity 
in DCs by establishing or strengthening local associations (Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 
2014). For example, the Swedish Development Agency is helping build stronger international 
partnerships to strengthen regional accounting associations in DCs (Fyson, 2012). 
The activities of the Northern accounting industry in DCs are under-researched and 
thence difficult to assess. Poullous and Uche (2012) suspect that in some jurisdictions they 
have brought division and fostered their interests at the expense of local provision of financial 
services and credentialing, have introduced inappropriate syllabi, and have impeded 
education and training in vital areas such as technician and tertiary education. However, lack 
of local political will, domestic divisions and poor standards have also hindered strengthening 
of DCs’ accounting professions and weakened DCs’ voices in the international arena. 
 
5.3 Propagating private ownership:, privatisations and multi-national corporations 
 As noted, many DCs sought to industrialise through state central planning and 
nationalisation policies which often produced fiscal crises (Hopper et al., 2009). 
Consequently, privatisations became frequent conditions of SAPs and remain a major plank 
of development policies. They are a panacea for their advocates but problem-ridden for critics 
(Josiah et al., 2010). Assessing the relative performance of SOEs and privatised corporations 
in DCs is difficult but the evidence that private enterprises outperform SOEs is inconclusive 
(Commander & Killick, 1988; Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1995; Uddin &Hopper, 2003). 
 Critics claim that privatisations yielded opportunities for undervalued sales, e.g. of 
state-owned shares in China (Ding & Graham, 2007); and excessive returns for owners where 
weak markets and little competition prevail (Megginson & Sutter, 2006; Parker & 
Kirkpatrick, 2005). The WB, IMF and Northern donors like USAID have been accused of 
ignoring local resistance to privatisation; employing inadequate financial systems for equity 
sales; ignoring local needs; and neglecting adequate regulation. Moreover, privatisations may 
not break undue political involvement with commercial organisations: it can find new 
avenues such as regulatory capture and tolerating financial irregularities (Hopper et al., 2012; 
Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005).  
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 Advocates of privatisation presume that private ownership and competition induce 
improved management information and performance evaluation systems, enhance market-
friendly products and services, and attract greater investment in marketing, operations and 
staff development (Hopper et al., 2012). Generally this is correct. Privatisations tend to bring 
more accurate, quicker computerised internal controls that improve market information and 
short-run planning, and match production to market demand (Hopper et al., 2009) but 
whether this invariably serves development goals is questionable. For example, a WB report 
on newly privatised companies in Bangladesh claimed that their success warranted further 
privatisations but independent research judged only one a commercial success and it 
questioned the narrow criterion in the WB report—namely profitability (Uddin & Hopper, 
2003).  
 Proponents of privatisation argue that efficiency benefits trickle down to employees 
and ultimately society. However, a Bangladeshi privatisation redistributed power and wealth 
to new owners who exercised direct and arbitrary control, casualised labour at lower 
remuneration, brought opaque financial disclosure, and reduced tax revenues (Uddin and 
Hopper, 2001). Similar results have been noted elsewhere, such as in South Africa 
(Catchpowle & Cooper, 1999) and in Ghana (Rahman et al., 2004); however, reports are not 
invariably bleak. The Ghanaian government’s and the WB’s and IMF’s assessment of two 
privatisations claimed that financial improvements, better customer service, improved 
internal business processes, greater learning and growth, and community benefits occurred 
(Tsamenyi et al., 2010) but it also stressed that privatisations should be evaluated against 
development criteria rather than via myopic macro-level and financial analyses. The latter 
plays an ideological and cultural role through an economically determinist discourse (Alam et 
al., 2004; Rahaman et al., 2004; 2007). For example, accounting disclosures by English gold-
mining companies in colonial Ghana helped legitimate extracting surplus value and 
repressive labour policies (Maltby & Tsamenyi, 2010): accounting discourse surrounding 
Balanced Scorecard performance indicators used to benchmark UK and Chinese units of a 
MNC rendered globalisation practical (Cooper & Ezzamel, 2013). A worry is that accounting 
discourses sustain neo-colonialism; for example, colonial control and accounting-maintained 
bonded labour relations in nineteenth-century colonial plantations in British Ceylon continue 
(Alawattage &  Wickramasinghe, 2009). 
Globalisation alters relations between international capital and nation-states, which 
raises major questions about the regulation of corporations. Traditional theories of 
imperialism cannot adequately explain how MNCs, culturally grounded in but not 
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geographically bound to one nation-state, can dominate the economic environment; and how 
international financial institutions beyond democratic control impose their preferred 
economic solutions and an elite-driven global order (Murphy, 2008). DCs are particularly 
vulnerable as they often lack the clout, expertise or resources - and even regulatory laws and 
institutions - to regulate MNCs (see Hopper et al., 2009). For example, US financial power, 
financialisation and global supply chains of Apple Inc. and Foxconn International Holdings 
drove down labour costs in China to the benefit of stockholders but not to society (Froud et 
al., 2014). Nevertheless, nation-states still have considerable power, functions and authority 
to effectively regulate MNCs, but their capacity to act is constrained by history, domestic 
concerns, and economic interests (Arnold & Sikka, 2001).  
MNCs can benefit DCs. If fairly regulated and taxed, they can provide resources, be 
models of good commercial practice, increase accounting capacity, and provide superior 
wages and benefits to SOEs or local businesses whose owners often lack capital to invest and 
reap short-run benefits,. For example, joint ventures between Northern MNCs and Chinese 
SOEs and private enterprises brought beneficial adoption of and experimentation with 
Northern accounting techniques (Firth, 1996; Zhou, 1988), despite political constraints 
(O’Connor et al., 2004; 2006). Privatisations bringing local rather than foreign ownership are 
not invariably more successful: locals can be venal capitalists too (Uddin & Hopper, 2003).  
Effective regulation entails the need for effective accounting systems. Transfer 
pricing remains a major concern globally and severely affects DC’s capacity to regulate and 
tax MNCs.12 DCs are disadvantaged because their domestic tax and administrative controls 
may be inadequate; financial statements of indigenous and MNC affiliates are unavailable; 
and the costs of complying with OECD guidelines are high (Emmanuel, 2012). Relations 
between rich Northern states and MNCs have produced weak regulation, thereby enabling 
transfer pricing to be abstracted from the politics and economics of international capitalism 
since 1945 (Armstrong, 1998). Undoubtedly, many MNCs use transfer pricing to avoid taxes 
and facilitate capital movements at the expense of state tax authorities, shareholders and other 
stakeholders (Sikka & Willmot, 2010). For example, Otusanya (2011) found that MNCs in 
the oil, gas, and manufacturing sectors of Nigeria use complex accounting structures that 
exploit legal ambiguities, tax havens and offshore financial centres to under-report profits and 
avoid tax. Formulating mutually beneficial transfer-pricing policies for Northern and 
Southern countries lies mainly with the OECD and UN, but OECD information-sharing 
                                                          
12 The OECD estimates that 60% of world trade involves intra-group transactions of MNCs (Emmanuel, 2012). 
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agreements between countries and tax havens have proven ineffective for Southern countries 
which have insufficient expertise to exert political influence. Emmanuel (2012) argued that 
they should devote less time to technical minutiae, which often spawns further loopholes for 
tax avoidance, and instead concentrate on achieving consensus on a transfer-pricing reform 
agenda and appoint a transnational regulator to regulate this and MNCs more generally. Sadly, 
this major accounting topic of global importance is neglected by accounting researchers. 
Similarly, there is scant research n how regulatory institutions (e.g. financial reporting 
and corporate governance regulators, national procurement agencies, SECs, anti-corruption 
agencies, and national audit offices) in DCs impact upon governance, accounting and 
transparency, which are substantial parts of IMF/WB recommendations in their Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes. Their existence is often cited in international circles and 
included in governance indices measuring state enforcement of transparent accountability of 
public and private enterprises but many DCs’ institutions are weakly constituted and not well 
funded, and consequently cannot regulate well-staffed and financially powerful companies and 
accounting firms. Gradually, they become another SOE driven by political imperatives, whilst 
appearing to ‘regulate’ in the eyes of international donors and funding institutions.  
5.4 Government accounting and the resurrection of the state 
Whilst transnational institutions’ policies for DCs still emphasise private sector growth, 
attracting FDI, privatisations and contracting out government services, it has become 
recognised that only the state can provide many large-scale services - e.g. health and 
education - and is often the major source of domestic capital and feasible leadership, 
particularly for major infrastructure projects. This brought more pragmatic policies and more 
aid (mostly from the North) going directly into DCs’ Treasuries; hence more effective 
government accounting systems to manage and allocate public resources are vital (Akakpo, 
2009; Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010; Schiavo-Campo, 2009). 
SAPs often reduced the number and pay of civil servants, thereby weakening state 
capacity but the WB Framework (2010) seeks to reverse this. It advocates increased local 
self-determination of programmes through improved education and training of government 
officials; implementing legal systems conducive to business development; and developing 
robust financial systems for micro credit organisations through to large corporations (Graham 
& Annisette, 2012). Transparent budgeting and accounting have become cornerstones of 
international policy (e.g. The Paris Declaration, 2005; Accra Agenda for Action, 2008; Busan 
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Partnership on Effective Development Participation, 2011) to improve decisions, local planning 
and control; reduce corruption and fiduciary risk; monitor the effectiveness of aid against 
development goals; and make funders more accountable to their constituencies (Fyson, 2012). 
However, although there may be agreement over the ends, achieving consensus over the means 
has been fraught with challenges. For example, in 2009, the Copenhagen Accord 13 apparently 
pledged US$100 billion annually to DCs to offset climate change but how to manage this locally 
and monitor progress has been beset with arguments. The fear is that many DCs’ governments 
may adopt the necessary legal and implementation frameworks but not enact effective 
government accounting systems, e.g. in Nigeria (Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010).  
 The continued advocacy of the WB and the IMF for NPM in government 
departments seeks a shift from input and process accountability (bureaucracy, rules, 
regulations) to results (appraising civil servants against key performance indicators); 
granting local managers greater discretion over means (subject to budget constraints); 
tendering out services; reconstructing civil service organisations around programmes; and 
improved reporting, accountability and monitoring mechanisms (Awio et al., 2007). The 
belief is that seeing citizens as customers and introducing Northern internal auditing and 
accounting systems will reduce principal-agent conflicts that civil servants face, improve 
information for decisions on programmes, help evaluate bids for service contracts or state 
assets, improve accountability, lessen corruption, and thus increase economic growth. 
Accounting has contributed to a discourse of ‘economic necessity’ and ‘there is no 
alternative’ disseminated by the WB (Saravanamuthu, 2004) but evidence that the 
improvements promised materialise and thence promote development is lacking (see 
Wynne & Lawrence, 2012a): at best the results appear patchy (Andrews, 2012). For 
example, WB‐sponsored reforms imposed on the Ghana Food Distribution Corporation 
only changed financial reporting practices: budgeting remained politicised, delayed, 
directionless and ineffective, and reporting to the monitoring agency produced no positive 
accountability and performance changes (Uddin & Tsamenyi, 2005). Similarly, Alam et 
al. (2004) found state development bank reforms incorporating profit centres and an 
emphasis on accounting results undermined the primacy of the local culture and 
beneficiaries in loan decisions. Furthermore, commercialised loan and repayment policies 
in the Fijian Development Bank hit a legacy of colonisation and racial discrimination, and 
                                                          
13 The Copenhagen Accord is an international agreement among 25 nations attending the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change Conference. 
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proved alien to the communal indigenous culture. A WB education project in Latin 
America to implant accounting governance practices and discourses met slippage, 
accommodation and resistance (Neu et al., 2008). Lastly, accounting technologies and 
agents within an IMF SAP team seeking Nigerian banking reforms hit contextual 
challenges and accounting data became ‘managed’: its potential disciplinary power 
remained but the government lacked the desire to enact it (Neu et al., 2010).  
From the late 1980s, integrated financial management information systems (IFMSs) and 
medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs) were frequently recommended. MTEFs link 
policy, planning and practice, normally over three years, to achieve a balanced budget and 
shift resources to pro-poor activities. IFMSs seek to facilitate more flexible responses to 
macro-economic and cash flow changes; and increase the accountability, efficiency and 
effectiveness of programmes through decentralisation, effective controls and improved data 
quality. Both require an ability to forecast accurately; clear national policies; government 
commitment; comprehensive budgets; coding that links results to inputs; transparent, 
accountable and effective civil service capacity; reliable indicators; local acceptance and 
involvement; a realistic and incremental change process; reasonably rewarded public servants; 
and cheap and reliable information technology. These are often lacking in Southern countries. 
Moreover, incentives to incorporate ‘best practice’ can be perverse. There is little evidence that 
improving public financial management, often introduced at the behest of the North, brings DCs 
more aid. Sometimes local officials use accounting systems and practices instituted by foreign 
donors to manipulate information to bolster the image and performance of organisations, e.g. 
Tanzanian local government departments did so to enhance their legitimacy for greater 
eligibility to grants and funding (Goddard & Mzenzi, 2015).    
Despite efforts of external aid-givers (particularly Northern donor government 
departments and international NGOs) to standardise and pool reporting by DCs, they must be 
accountable to their electorate and follow domestic legislation. Moreover, funders often want 
quick results on specific tangible achievements to impress their constituents (e.g. schools built) 
whereas capacity-building is long-term, less tangible, multi-faceted, and incremental. Thus 
donors may prioritise risk-minimisation that reduces local discretion, adaptability, 
standardisation and integration of accounting systems contrary to stated policy objectives, 
leaving local officials to deal with many complex and conflicting accounting requirements, 
which has weakened local development of public financial management (and also in NGOs) (de 
Renzio, 2006). Moreover, foreign consultants on short contracts and unacquainted with local 
conditions can reduce the confidence of local managers and produce reforms not tailored to 
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the local context and available resources. Inequities in experience, status and qualifications 
may prohibit locals from challenging foreign consultants at the specification, tendering and 
implementation stages of accounting projects. This inadvertently stifles local involvement 
and contributes to reforms that do not deliver the improvements promised (Wynne & 
Lawrence, 2012b). For example, despite “billions of aid dollars, mountains of red tape, heavy 
burdens on local government staff, and literally centuries of full-time-equivalent technical 
expertise devoted to MTEF” results are disappointing (Schiavo-Campo, 2009, p.7); and in 
much of Africa IFMSs proved too complex for local needs and needed substantial customisation 
(Peterson, 2007).  
Accounting language underpins discourses of globalisation policies. For example, it 
underpinned a modernisation agenda directed at changing citizen attitudes during pension 
reforms in Chile (Himick, 2009); loan agreements between the WB, the UN Development 
Agency and some Latin American governments incorporated financial and accounting 
discourses that were alien and meaningless to many in DCs, which eventually hindered the 
reforms (Neu et al., 2006; 2008; 2009); for example, accountability and transparency reforms 
advocated by the Inter‐American Development Bank and UNDP officials in El Salvador 
raised loan beneficiaries’ aspirations but, once implemented, the discourse and practices had 
to be changed because locals found they restricted their social space and contravened 
established practices (Neu et al., 2009). 
Reformers seeking accounting and governance changes in DCs can meet tough 
resistance from domestic politicians. Reforms can have unanticipated and unintended 
consequences and become instruments that nullify their very aims (de Renzio, 2006). For 
example, the General Inspectorate of State in Benin – a key accounting institution reinstated 
within good governance reforms of the President – was used to persecute unions and other 
organisations (including civil society ones) demanding public investigations of financial 
scandals (Wynne, 2011). Similar cases were reported for anti-corruption institutions in 
Malawi – they were used to eliminate political rivals. Local politicians may lack commitment 
to accounting reforms that erode their power to siphon public funds from government 
treasuries and extract economic rents within a façade of rules (Cammack, 2007). For example, 
anti-corruption initiatives in Uganda threatening the regime’s patronage-based support lacked 
political commitment (Robinson, 2006). The failure of IFMS in Ghana was attributed to 
politicians believing that it was a technical matter foisted on them, but their support waned when 
they realised the political implications of greater transparency and accountability (Wynne, 2005). 
In Tanzania, the government sought to benefit from the legitimacy associated with the 
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activities of its supreme audit institution, the National Audit Office of Tanzania whilst 
simultaneously constraining its reach and influence, which subordinated auditors and 
produced contradictory public sector auditing practices (Goddard & Malagila, 2015). In 
Benin, the Chamber of Accounts, the supreme audit institution, has never had the resources 
or independence needed to audit government accounts: it performs less than ten per cent of its 
constitutional mandate, allowing corruption and misappropriations across the government 
sector to thrive (Akakpo, 2009), and telecommunications reforms required no accounting – 
making it difficult to trace where millions of US dollars were spent (Sutherland, 2011).  
Development specialists often attribute such problems to neopatrimonialism (Le Vine, 
1980; Roth, 1968) - a hybrid post-Weberian invention: “a creative mix of two Weberian types 
of domination: a traditional subtype, patrimonial domination, and rational-legal bureaucratic 
domination” (Erdmann & Engel, 2007, p.104). Weber (1947) saw patrimonialism as a 
traditional and legitimate form of authority often found in small-scale, traditional, sometimes 
tribal societies where relations between rulers and subjects are not governed by predictable 
economic calculations and codified laws (Pitcher et al., 2009). Here rulers distribute symbolic 
and material rewards (often unevenly) to fulfil reciprocal obligations in a shared culture. 
Relations are direct, dyadic and personal with no delineation of private and public realms or 
formal mechanisms of accountability or transparency. Nevertheless, leaders are accountable 
within traditional collective codes (Pitcher et al., 2009).  
Eisenstadt (1973), Médard (1983) and Clapham (1985) added the prefix ‘neo’ to 
distinguish contemporary patrimonialism from its traditional form. Here officials “hold 
positions in bureaucratic organizations with formally defined powers exercised, insofar as they 
can, not towards public service but as if they are private property” (Erdmann & Engel, 2007, p. 
48) and they personally distribute resources (‘rents’ in modern economic terminology) 
informally to further their interests (Kelsall, 2011). The distinction between private and public 
spheres formally exists and public reference is made to it, but in practice the distinction is 
blurred. Rational-legal formal rules define authority and responsibilities and provide 
legitimacy for seeming bureaucracies but, within them, patronage, clientelism, corruption, 
nepotism and ethnicity abound (Lemarchand & Legg, 1972; Scott, 1969; Zolberg, 1969). The 
exercise of power in neo-patrimonial regimes is erratic and incalculable. It is (but not always) 
associated with corruption by rulers, i.e. Presidents, MPs, chiefs, party officials, and 
government bureaucrats.  
Nevertheless, citizens, particularly rural villagers, may expect patrimony from local 
leaders. Elections may be rigged and are expensive for candidates, and political loyalties may 
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split along ethnic, regional or religious lines. Given their scepticism of politics, politicians, 
and the state, and orientations to traditional patrimonial leadership, civil society is ‘weak and 
silent’ in many DCs (Cammack, 2007, p. 600). Indeed, democracy and multi-party elections 
can intensify neo-patrimonial governance (voters seek bribes and favours from candidates 
who then recoup their electoral costs from illicit raids on government resources). Goddard et 
al. (2015) uses Ekeh’s (1975) concept of ‘two publics’ to explain persistent corrupt practices, 
weak accountability, and their impact on government accounting in Africa. Society is split 
between a highly amoral civic public with strong connections with Northern donors, and a 
primordial public with strong moral values but little expectation that civic public members 
will adhere to such values. Drawing on a Tanzania case, the nexus between these publics, 
particularly the civic public’s lack of morality led “to opportunistic, lawless and corrupt 
tendencies” (ibid, p.15) and sustained unscrupulous accounting practices across the 
government sector. Reconciling accounting reforms to increase indigenous involvement, civil 
society involvement and broader development goals with national sovereignty and neo-
patrimonial governance is arguably the major accounting issue in DCs today, and by 
implication, it warrants greater research attention. 
 
5.5 Social and environmental accountability 
Following the international acceptance of the Millennium Development Goals, the onus 
of protecting DCs has increasingly fallen on the UN secretary-general, the WB president and 
the IMF’s managing director, all proponents of globalisation (Cobham & McNair, 2012). 
Accounting policies and practices should now be judged against HDI goals: stock market and 
economic measures that permeate accounting are woefully inadequate for the realms of civil 
society, ecology, politics, inequality, gender, health and education. However, the WB and 
IMF still judge DCs’ accounting progress according to their adoption of ‘Northern’ market-
based accounting (Andrews, 2012). The presumption that appearing to conform to Northern 
systems denotes success is questionable given that actual conformity is often absent or that 
such accounting can produce dysfunctional and unanticipated consequences. 
Globalisation and trade liberalisation have damaged the environment, giving rise to 
environmental activism and protests globally (Ritzer, 2007; Stiglitz, 2003). For example, the 
beef and soybean industries are primarily responsible for deforestation of the Amazon 
(Nepstad et al., 2006); in India, arguably an example of successful globalisation, environment 
degradation has had drastic consequences for the poor (Martens & Raza, 2010); outsourcing 
production from the UK and Denmark to China increased its carbon footprint (Herrmann & 
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Hauschild, 2009); and global warming created partly by globalisation may increase 
temperatures by 1.50C to 4.50C in many areas, make others cooler, and alter rainfall 
regionally (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1996). DCs are particularly 
vulnerable given their lack of resources to mitigate these consequences. Proponents of 
globalisation, such as the WTO, claim that its policies encourage environmental improvement 
but their statistical justifications may apply only where ‘weak conditions’ are satisfied, or 
when limited environment metrics are used (Hecht et al., 2006).  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting in DCs has been under-researched 
(Belal & Cooper, 2011) although work is emerging.14 CSR reporting practices have been 
observed in Thailand (Kuasirikun & Sherer, 2004), Bangladesh (Islam & Deegan, 2008); 
South Africa (De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006; Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013), Ghana (Maltby 
& Tsamenyi, 2010), and Mauritius (Mahadeo et al., 2011). Trends towards CSR may reflect 
changing stakeholder and societal attitudes (De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006; Soobaroyen & 
Ntim, 2013), and may mimic CSR developments in Northern countries, disseminated through 
material such as the Global Reporting Initiative and the Integrated Reporting Framework. 
CSR aims vary between countries; some are directed at foreign audiences - e.g. multinational 
buyers in Bangladesh, or funders in Ghana - whilst elsewhere local influence predominates - 
e.g. South Africa. Most empirical work depicts CSR as a strategy for stakeholder 
management and maintaining organisational legitimacy. It questions whether globalised 
capitalism can engender social progress. For example, Bangladeshi corporations are unlikely 
to report on child labour practices, equal opportunities and poverty alleviation, given their 
lack of resources, their profit imperative, no legal requirements, absence of knowledge and 
awareness of the issues, and fears that reporting poor social performance would generate bad 
publicity. Fijian accountants were unwilling to engage in environmental accounting due to 
their lack of competence, its voluntary nature, and practical difficulties (Lodhia, 2003). Even 
when social and environmental reporting was a WB funding condition results can be 
disappointing; for example, in the Volta River Authority in Ghana, and Delco in Sierra Leone, 
it masked transnational capital penetration and exploitation (Rahaman et al., 2004; Tinker, 
1980).  
Changing development policies raise new accounting issues, such as human rights15 
(see Lauwo & Otusanya, 2014). However, its emergence within CSR discourse has critics 
                                                          
14 For example, see the Accounting Forum Special Issue on reporting in emerging and developing economies 
(Vol. 37, No. 2, 2013). 
15 Refer to the special issue on human rights in Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2011, V.22, N.8) 
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(McPhail &  McKernan, 2011). Some see it as a triumph of modernity (Douzinas, 2000), 
critical legal scholars question whether it pursues class and gender interests (Dembour, 2006), 
and others dismiss it as postmodern cynicism when so many people are subjugated, starved, 
or exterminated (Douzinas, 2000; 2007). Sikka (2011) claims that accounting has not 
responded to this agenda, except for some MNCs that use stabilisation clauses to constrain a 
host country’s ability to protect and enhance human rights, as in the Chad–Cameroon oil and 
pipeline project. He puts greater faith in counter accounts that challenge the hegemony of 
corporations whilst Lauwo and Otusanya (2014) advocate board and governance reforms to 
ensure greater corporate accountability and commitment to human rights. However, the 
situation is not entirely bleak. Accounting and social disclosure contributed to South African 
divestment debates in the USA during the 1970s and 1980s (Arnold & Hammond, 1994). In 
2011 the UN Human Rights Council endorsed Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights and some corporations have incorporated this, such as TNT and AngloGold Ashanti. 
Eighteen major global clothing and retail companies from 1990 to 2007 made significant 
disclosures according to the International Labour Organisation's (ILO) workplace human 
rights standards (Islam &  McPhail, 2011). In this context, corporate developments may be 
outstripping academic research here (Gray & Gray, 2011). The WB and IMF, like aid 
departments of Northern governments, struggle to reconcile their commitment to Millennium 
Development Goals, good governance, and adopting social indicators with a neo-liberal 
Northern accounting hegemony. Whether they are reconcilable is questionable and lies at the 
heart of social and environmental accounting research (Molisa et al., 2012).  
 
5.6 The Rise of Non-governmental Organisations: Accountability to Whom?16 
A by-product of changing development policies has been the rise of NGOs, some of 
which (e.g. BRAC and AXA in Bangladesh) now resemble international conglomerates. 
Defining NGOs is difficult: they are not new, they vary in size, and many are not involved in 
development. However, since the 1980s, NGOs have become major agents in development. 
NGOs are no longer perceived as small bands of activists but rather as new `super brands’ 
serving consumers who grant them more esteem than major corporations, government bodies 
and even the media (Wootliff &  Deri, 2001).  
The ‘boom’ period for NGOs is related to structural transformations in capitalism; 
namely macro-economic instability in many DCs and shifts to formally liberal democracies 
                                                          
16 This section draws considerably from Ahmed and Hopper (2015). 
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and civil society participation (Mitlin et al., 2007). NGOs appeal across the political spectrum 
(Clarke, 1998). Some have transcended financial, operational and ideological barriers to 
become viewed by governments and corporations as potent political forces (Gray et al., 2006; 
Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006a). For liberals, NGOs help to balance state and business interests 
and prevent them from abusing their power (Lewis, 2001). For neo-liberals, NGOs are private 
sector institutions that encourage market behaviour such as through micro-credit, 
entrepreneurship training, and private ‘not-for-profit’ actions. For the left, NGOs promise a 
‘new politics’ of social transformation with an alternative radical strategy for capturing state 
power and overcoming centralisation. Subsequently, NGOs can mean all things to all people 
(Clarke, 1998; Gray et al., 2006; Mitlin et al., 2007). 
The WB classifies NGOs into two main categories.17 Operational NGOs design and 
implement projects in areas such as disaster relief, health care, education, housing, legal 
provision, and micro-credit. Advocacy NGOs defend or promote a cause and influence 
policies and practices, particularly alleviating poverty by promoting equity, citizen 
participation, expanding rural employment and income, and fostering democratic 
organisations such as farmers' associations and co-operatives. The operational and advocacy 
categories are not mutually exclusive - many NGOs engage in both. 
Many NGOs have responded to changing development policies and promulgate 
market forces alongside good governance (Howell, 2002). Northern governments’ linking of 
aid to political reform, and placing more funding directly into DCs’ government coffers has 
lessened external funding for operational services (Fisher, 1998). Thus many NGOs have 
switched from delivering welfare services to providing micro-credit and advocacy of greater 
democracy, often on Northern models, and campaigning over environmental, gender, civil 
society accountability, and social development issues (Pearce, 2006; Unerman & Bennet, 
2004; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2010). NGOs offer Northern funders the means to engage with a 
wider spectrum of civil interest groups (Mercer, 2002) and they have succeeded in gaining 
access to policy makers and getting their ideas implemented through activism, campaigning 
and policy dialogue (Clarke, 1998).  
Support for NGOs stems from their alleged proximity to remote communities and the 
poor (Awio et al., 2011); efficient low-cost operations, e.g. micro-credit programmes (Hulme 
& Moore, 2007); promotion of sustainable development (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2007); and 
their potential for organising and representing civil society (Devine, 2006; Gray et al., 2006; 
                                                          
17 See World Bank report “NGO World Bank Collaboration” published in www.worldbank.org. 
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Lehman, 2007). Nevertheless, NGOs are not universally acclaimed. They have been accused 
of being ‘Janus-like’ organisations exhibiting ‘mushroom growth’ (Turner & Hulme, 1997); 
continuing the missionary tradition and being handmaidens of capitalist change (Temple, 
1997); showing scanty evidence of superior long-term performance (1993; Vivian & Maseko, 
1994); being resource brokers rather than change agents (Pearce, 2006); providing palliatives 
to poverty rather than precipitating significant structural change (Tembo, 2003; Wright, 
2012); serving so many of the divergent vested interests that fundamental development 
problems are denied (Rahmani, 2012; Wright, 2012); and drifting from their original mission 
and even into financial corruption (Gibelman & Gelman, 2004; Townsend & Townsend, 
2004). Independent information on NGOs’ practices and whether beliefs underpinning their 
rapid growth are justified is lacking (Jordan & Van Tuijl, 2000). Some commentators remain 
suspicious of claims that NGOs represent civil society and promote democratic development, 
arguing that their legitimacy owes more to ideology and unproven assumptions of dominant 
institutions rather than to wider political development debates (Gray et al., 2006; Lehman, 
2007; Rahmani, 2012). 
Tensions between neo-liberal economic policies, broader development goals and 
good-governance policies are exemplified in debates about micro-finance. Roy (2010) 
delineates a ‘Washington’ - i.e. WB and IMF - approach to micro-finance that renders 
poverty alleviation an economic problem caused by the poor’s lack of access to capital for 
entrepreneurial ventures, best rendered by commercial institutions. She contrasts this with the 
‘Bangladesh’ approach pioneered by NGOs such as Grameen whereby lending is linked to 
education and training of loan recipients on business skills - but also to empower them 
socially and politically. Roy (2010) fears that the market-led approaches reduce the poor and 
marginalised to economic subjects and ignores development issues such as increasing civil 
society influence upon politics. Jacobs et al. (2012) express similar fears, arguing that 
microfinance’s accounting can be an instrument of oppression and exploitation, rendering the 
poor the financiers of poverty alleviation. 
The structures within which NGOs operate, particularly international ones, creates an 
inherent accountability problem. Edwards and Hulme (1995, p. 224) state that they “are 
accountable to trustees in one country but working with communities in others; committed to 
fundamental reforms but funded by donors and supporters who (by and large) demand short 
term results”. If their accountability fails to reproduce their mission aims they appear 
hypocritical. The concern is that adopting conventional accounting may deflect their (NGOs’) 
accountability from their fundamental values, missions and obligations to grassroots clients 
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(Gray et al., 2006). Unerman and O’Dwyer (2012) trace four forms of NGO accountability: 
identity, upward and downward, and holistic. Identity accountability is confined to a few 
NGOs with members strongly committed to their moral ends. Holistic accountability 
incorporates broader social, environmental and economic factors - the basis of many NGOs’ 
missions. Given shifts to good-governance policies, social and environmental accounting 
systems are no longer esoteric fantasies but lie at the heart of contemporary development. 
Upward accountability is primarily to donors;  it uses conventional financial accounts and 
narratives to monitor whether resources were spent as planned and efficiently. Downward 
accountability entails dialogue with clients so they can influence NGO activities in the spirit 
of empowerment and involvement. 
There are tensions in reconciling upward (formal) and downward (informal) 
accountability. Upward accountability mechanisms can overemphasise short-term 
quantitative targets and favour hierarchical management structures, resulting in “.. 
‘accountancy’ rather than accountability” (Edwards & Hulme, 1996, p. 968) that only 
measures the easily measurable, neglects less tangible social and political goals, and does not 
reflect the longer-run effectiveness of aid. For example, three Tanzanian NGOs with formal, 
structured and adequately staffed systems were not perceived as more accountable (Goddard 
& Assad, 2006, p.397); and, when a microfinance NGO in Zambia undergoing crisis and 
fraud improved its upward accountability, it detracted from the vital reliance upon and trust 
needed amongst borrowing groups and loan officers (Dixon et al., 2006). However, NGOs 
are not immune from corruption, mismanagement, mission drift, and capture by powerful 
interest groups and funders; and NGO legislation and regulation is inadequate in many DCs, 
hence the need for upward accountability. 
NGOs are caught in a dilemma. Pressing demands of upward accountability to donors, 
and adoption of hierarchical management controls following NGOs’ growing scale and 
scope, can impede the downward accountability many seek. For example, the Red Cross, the 
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership and the Sphere Project jeopardised their 
humanitarian and moral goals by adhering to scripts emphasising neutrality, commerce, and 
performance (Everett and Friesen, 2010); an Irish aid organisation struggled to reconcile 
greater accountability demands with its social goals, particularly empowerment of clients 
(O’Dwyer, 2005); the Irish section of Amnesty International feared that their reliance on 
internal accountability, augmented with ad hoc external accountability mechanisms, had 
stymied managers’ preference for holistic accountability to a wide range of stakeholders, 
privileged a narrow range of (potentially) powerful stakeholders, and was counterproductive 
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to its mission (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008); and neo-liberal “development accounting” 
designed to empower the rural poor in a Sri Lankan village actually disempowered them due 
to local politics and patronage (Jayasinghe & Wickramasinghe, 2011).  
Accountability to clients is crucial, as many NGO officers are unelected, and NGOs 
can become vehicles for ideology (Lehman, 2007). Mindful of such dangers, some donors 
and funders advocate beneficiary involvement. However, actual accountability and ‘textbook’ 
notions of downward accountability proclaimed by NGO chiefs can diverge: it can be 
tokenistic and not lead to changes in core development ideals and attitudes (O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2010). Moreover, its formalisation may corrupt well-meaning intentions of those 
demanding downward accountability, leading to ambiguity and misplaced priorities amongst 
NGOs’ staff (Dixon et al., 2006). Given that clients are often illiterate, and are not habituated 
to participation or exercising their human rights, this often requires verbal and imaginative 
means of downward accountability, otherwise it may merely serve to legitimate the process 
of downward accountability (Goddard & Assad, 2006).  
Development studies researchers express concerns about how a fixation with 
accountability may deflect NGOs from their objectives and ideals (Van Ufford et al., 2003) 
but few explore the role of accounting practices and techniques therein. There is a need for 
accounting researchers to delve further into how NGOs can best design and enact accounting 
systems that reproduce and monitor broader development aims whilst satisfying the demands 
of Northern funders.  
 
6 Discussion and conclusions 
Whilst many studies of accounting, globalisation and development remain a-theoretical 
(van Helden &Uddin, 2016), many others use a wide range of theories, 18  explicitly or 
implicitly, often from institutional theory and political economy (e.g. Iyoha & Oyerinde, 
2010; Schiavo-Campo, 2009). This reflects the social, political and cultural turn of much 
accounting research over the last three decades, and its extension to conceptualise how the 
dynamics of globalisation and its accounting, play out in DCs (Alawattage et al., 2015). 
                                                          
18 They include institutional theory (e.g. Arnold, 2005; Covaleski et al., 2003; Firth, 1996; Mir & Rahaman, 
2005; Rahaman et al., 2004), Foucault (governmentality) (e.g. Everett et al., 2007;  Lehman, 2005; Neu & 
Heincke, 2004), legitimacy and stakeholder theory (e.g. Islam & Deegan, 2008; Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013), 
Weber and notions of rationality (e.g. Dyball & Valcrcel, 1999; Uddin, 2009), structuration theory (e.g. 
Jayasinghe & Thomas, 2009; Uddin & Tsamenyi, 2005), political hegemony (e.g. Alawattage & 
Wickramasinghe, 2008; Yee, 2009; 2012), political economy (e.g. Armstrong, 1998; Belal &Cooper, 2011; 
Lassou & Hopper, 2015; Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005), concepts of imperialism (e.g. Annisette & Neu, 
2004; Chua & Poullaos, 2002; Catchpowle and Cooper, 1999), and labour process and professionalisation 
theories (e.g. social closure) (e.g. Hamond et al., 2009, 2012; Sian, 2011; Uche, 2002; Uddin & Hopper, 2001). 
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Many of these studies critique mainstream macro-economic development perspectives after 
discovering that accounting premised on economic assumptions is mediated by socio-political 
and cultural factors, with positive and negative, and intended or unintended, consequences. 
Weber’s delineation of tradition versus ‘rational-legal’ bureaucracy in modern society has 
been widely used to explain how accounting reforms have unintended consequences in 
societies that do not share the underlying assumptions of such reforms. Overall, there is 
greater recognition of the need to afford greater voice to indigenous actors - but how to do so 
remains problematic. This has spurred deeper theorisation of how societal dynamics 
involving factors such as race, ethnicity, culture, religion, colonial history, political 
emancipation and politics impinge on mainstream accounting and accountability. For 
example, Hopper et al. (2009) use a cultural-political economy approach to identify how 
factors19 in five different economic and political regimes in many DCs shaped management 
accounting. Alawattage et al. (2015) call for greater epistemic theorisation of global pressures 
for accounting change and of how decision-makers in DCs perceive and translate these 
changes and its implications for how accounting reforms are communicated, deployed and 
used (if at all) locally. However, further theorisations critically examining how accounting 
impacts upon local economies, communities, the disadvantaged, and ensuing resistance are 
emerging: e.g. Bourdieu (Alawattage, 2011); actor-network theory (How and Alawattage, 
2012); Habermas’ theory of communicative action (Kuasirikun, 2011); globalisation theories 
(the global-local dialectic) (Barrett et al., 2005).  
A recurring finding is that accounting knowledge and practices in DCs are driven by 
‘international accounting institutions’ such as the IASB and IFAC, with the WB, IMF and 
UN acting as mediating agents, and large Northern (often the ‘Big 4’) accounting consultants 
delivering the technical detail. Together they reproduce Northern systems and ideology in 
private and public sectors alike and often further Northern commercial interests, not least in 
financial services, where the ‘Big 4’ accounting firms and Northern accounting associations 
seek global expansion. Much aid is channelled back to donor countries through fees, and 
procurement of technology and equipment from Northern suppliers (Chang, 2007; Schiavo-
Campo, 2009). This is aided by the WB gauging DCs’ accounting and profession solely 
against international accounting and auditing standards and often concluding they are 
inadequate, e.g. ROSC exercises for Morocco in 2002, and for Nigeria in 2004. Admittedly, 
some local accounting practices and professions have been found to be linked to unethical 
                                                          
19 The factors were mode of production; culture, ethnicity and race; the state, regulation and law; political 
parties; industrial relations, and ‘globalisation dynamics’ pertaining to international finance. 
37 
 
behaviours and thereby discredited by association (Lassou at al., 2014). A further frequent 
observation is the asymmetry of power between Northern and Southern governments, 
professional associations, MNCs, and transnational accounting and auditing standard setters. 
Sadly, attempts of global accounting regulators to redress this have lacked scale and 
substance: this is a practical but also a moral issue, as many DCs lack the resources, expertise, 
and sometimes the leadership to influence global accounting principles and practices. Many 
transnational accounting organisations fail to recognise this: DCs are under-represented 
within IFAC and particularly the IASB; and the IASB has shown little willingness to 
countenance challenges to their authority and legitimacy. 
Northern accounting associations are major purveyors of accounting knowledge and 
credentialing of accountants across DCs. Despite their potential to help DCs increase their 
accounting capacity, their activities are often problematic. Many DCs established their own 
tertiary and other indigenous educational institutions, and professional associations, which 
were often under-resourced and lack expertise; accordingly they aligned themselves with 
Northern associations (e.g. as approved learning partners) and Northern higher education 
institutions to gain international recognition (Bennell & Pearce, 2003; Yapa, 2006). There are 
reports of successful collaboration but this carries dangers. Often, indigenous accountants 
learn Northern accounting rules/principles to the detriment of local ones, and problems of 
applying Northern accounting technologies to local conditions are ignored. Moreover, it 
divides Northern credentialed accountants, often employed by large Northern accounting 
firms serving resident MNCs or MNCs themselves, from local association members. Ensuing 
conflicts feed beliefs that local accounting standards/rules and accounting professions are 
weak and below expected standards, and weaken DC governments’ attempts to cultivate local 
accounting capacity, strengthen local associations, and provide the necessary legislation and 
infrastructure. Unfortunately, we know little about how and why Northern professional 
associations embark on and formulate their globalisation policies; their alliances and relations 
with domestic associations and tertiary education institutions; whether policies, syllabi and 
practices vary across associations and country collaborations; whether indigenous 
governments and other local constituencies support their activities; and whether they 
strengthen local accounting capacity - not least in financial service markets.  
In looking forward it is important to also look back. A deeper understanding of 
globalisation of accounting may emerge from studies drawing on national archives or 
archives of large MNCs. Such sources have revealed how accounting was implicated in the 
exploitation, expropriation, and extermination of original populations in settler and non-
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settler colonies; and the troubled development of their national professions. Historical work 
can bring new insights that challenge our knowledge of accounting functions and operations 
in DCs and offera better understanding of context to inform contemporary solutions. 
The rise of powerful new global players such as China, India, Russia and South Africa 
from non-Northern countries, and global alliances, may change Northern dominance, e.g. 
China has a growing commercial and cultural presence across Africa20 – its investments grew 
from US$1.57 billion in 2007 to US$5.49 in 2009.21 It is heavily involved in infrastructure 
and educational projects. Yet we know little about their activities or their effect in the 
accounting arena. How do they manage their operations in DCs? How do their accounting 
systems and practices travel to other DCs? Are they drawn from Northern or home-country 
approaches? Do they accommodate the requirements, culture, and accounting systems and 
practices in the host country, or do they reproduce hegemonic and neo-colonial tendencies 
like their Northern counterparts? 
It is, however, problematic to assume that transnational organisations constitute a 
homogenous whole and pursue a unitary goal. We know little about their internal dynamics, 
their inter-relationships, and their outcomes. Recent reviews (e.g. Alawattage et al., 2016; van 
Helden & Uddin, 2016) recognise the importance of the discourses of ‘globalising agents’ but 
insights from WB and IMF actors are scarce. For example, at the UN and G20 summits, the 
WB and IMF criticised international accounting regulators for neglecting DCs, and urged 
global alliances of professional accounting associations to include more members from DCs. 
The WB is a large bureaucracy with various departments dealing with accounting issues and 
its field officers are scattered globally. It now has more accountants engaged in policy and 
advice but accounting researchers know little about their work and have little interaction with 
them. Their work may contain multiple agendas, interests and ideologies susceptible to 
different geopolitical and regional realities and approaches. For example, within the WB, the 
regional representatives for Francophone Africa are often French and trained or worked in the 
French administrative system. French geopolitical interests in Francophone Africa are more 
formally and elaborately structured than in former British African colonies (Joseph, 1976; 
Lassou, 2014; Martin, 1995). Similarly, in the IMF, the advisor for AFRITAC (the Regional 
Centre of Technical Assistance for West Africa)22 is a former French official from the French 
                                                          
20 See: http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/jmhz/ [Accessed Friday 04 September 2015]. 
21 These figures may be under-reported and China also provides substantial loan financing to Africa, mainly 
commodity-backed (e.g. by oil and minerals) (Sun, 2014). 
22 This covers Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Guinea, Bissau Guinea, Senegal, and 
Togo. 
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Ministry of Cooperation. Could this produce different policy orientations for ex-French 
colonies to once British ones? There is little research on how accounting policies and policy-
making, so important for DCs, are formulated in transnational institutions: and by whom? 
What are the internal conflicts and debates, whose advice is sought, and why? 
Critical accounting scholars need to engage with global financial and development 
institutions such as the WB and IMF to investigate how differing globalisation tendencies are 
represented and how they involve accounting, and to formulate effective but tailored 
solutions for DCs. Relevant accounting research is rarely presented in development journals 
and conferences. Accounting researchers’ lack of interaction with officials in transnational 
institutions involved in accounting is surprising, particularly as they tend to be transparent 
and open and interactions with development economists are commonplace. Accounting 
researchers need to move beyond traditional means of knowledge diffusion to make an 
impact. 
 Although market-based accounting still dominates their accounting prescriptions for 
DCs, world leaders’ commitment to Millennium Goals and good governance creates space 
for alternative accountings pertinent to Northern and Southern societies alike; e.g. CSR 
accounting, downward accountability and civil society involvement, human rights accounting, 
and the promotion of democracy (Lehman, 2005). Public participation in budget movements in 
DCs has brought experimentation in grass roots involvement in projects and local governance. 
Increasing beneficiary and civil society involvement may require unorthodox, informal controls 
across a wide range of social criteria to resist the economic reductionism of conventional 
accounting. Transparent and open accounting available to civil society organisations that 
monitor and report on government spending and an independent media may be more productive 
than internal controls that check compliance with externally prescribed accounting practices.  
Nevertheless, in the midst of the excitement this generates, it is important to remember 
that conventional accounting is still advocated for effective governance and development, and 
plays an important role in planning, decision making, control and accountability, while 
matters like greater transparency, broader disclosure and improved transfer-pricing 
regulations are relevant to development goals. Whether some accounting that furthers broader 
development goals and good governance can be reconciled with conventional accounting 
remains an open issue. For example, NGOs endeavouring to meet donors’ requirements and to 
manage their often large and complex organisations have increasingly adopted conventional 
Northern accounting, at possible cost to their humanitarian missions, beneficiary involvement 
and advocacy of political change. More work is required here, including whether this is practical 
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and desired by beneficiaries and civil society, and whether - and if so, how - it can be meshed 
with local cultures and beliefs. Like issues raised by advocacy NGOs and CSR researchers they 
are essential not just for pressing practical reasons but also because they are fundamental to 
human rights and morality. 
Governments and NGOs signed up to achieving ecological and social goals have hit 
problems measuring and weighting them, particularly in the longer run, less tangible ends 
such as civil society involvement embracing pluralistic dialogue. Should they be criteria 
when granting and monitoring funding? Who will do the measurements? What regulation is 
needed and will it be effective? Transnational financial institutions may be the least objective 
and neutral actors for this (Harrison, 2004). How will inequities of power and risk be 
recognised and will the burden fall mainly on DCs and the poor? Many DCs lack the legal 
and regulatory structures and resources for such exercises and they may formally accept such 
ends but not enact or manipulate them. If this is the case, should transnational institutions 
intervene and, if so, does this warrant external intervention into domestic politics? Such 
interventions are not new - transnational organisations already produce and reproduce a 
particular hegemony. Whatever the case, an alternative hegemony must replace international 
harmonisation of accounting based on a neo-liberal economic conceptual framework biased 
towards Northern interests. This may require thinking outside the box: a more critical 
conception of ‘accountability’ based on post-modern and post-structural accounting models 
may be needed (Lehman, 2005; 2009).  
This paper catalogues a litany of failed or disappointing accounting reforms in DCs in 
the face of globalisation. Reforms are often implemented but prove irrelevant or unsuitable 
for local circumstances and needs, and become ceremonial, unused, or used for unintended 
purposes, and even be dysfunctional. A frequent recommendation is to grant greater ownership 
and influence to DC governments, civil servants, managers, beneficiaries and civil society to 
draw on local knowledge more, put basic support requirements in place, and instigate a better 
sequence of reforms. However, parties within DCs may not have congruent interests. 
Governments and businesses may not welcome transparency, or media and civil society scrutiny. 
Reforms must accommodate the indigenous political rationality, the national context, involve 
civil society; and avoid simply imposing Northern assumptions and practices that create 
mutually exclusive solutions: e.g. the state versus markets, state centralisation versus 
decentralisation to local organisations; civil society versus the body politic. More progress may 
come if applying foreign political logics is avoided; for instance, beliefs about legitimate 
governance and democracy may differ greatly in many DCs than in the North. Ideally, reforms 
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should be based on knowledge of what accounting systems are effective, why, and how. This 
requires more grounded, processual and collaborative action research with locals to better 
link accounting to local circumstances and beliefs. Whilst accounting reforms and other 
technologies in the North are admittedly not devoid of criticism (Everett et al., 2007; Sikka, 
2008), what is problematic in the case of DCs is the extent to which  technologies may be 
contributing to significant issues affecting health, education, poverty, food supply and other 
socio-economic ‘necessities’. Similarly to Northern countries, these reforms do not operate 
satisfactorily and ‘muddle along’, but crucially, their implications and consequences are far 
reaching. Furthermore, institutional safeguards in Northern countries (relatively independent 
regulators, effective judiciary recourse, civil society and press activism) may mitigate some of 
these consequences more effectively than in DCs.  
In states with non-developmental characteristics,23 accounting reforms may achieve little 
without political change: but not all forms of neo-patrimonialism preclude economic 
development (Hopper, 2016). Local projects can benefit from leadership and coordination from 
benign neo-patrimonial leaders oriented to fostering longer-run attributes of developmental 
states. Accounting reformers must recognise political contexts: i.e. how are decisions made and 
in whose interests? Why do formal accounting mechanisms remain so weak? Where do the 
networks of power reside? What logic drives policy? How is bureaucracy maintained and used? 
Are traditions a factor; and how are elections won? Accounting reforms that fail to consider their 
political and cultural feasibility and realistic means of implementation may prove useless. In so 
doing it is important to distinguish political leaders from public servants. A powerful, stable, 
competent and insulated bureaucracy may exist or can be nurtured with the authority to create, 
direct and manage development; and be sufficiently competent, professional and autonomous to 
resist tests of political loyalty, even in many neo-patrimonial regimes.  
It is wrong to lay corruption problems just at the doors of DCs. Many have corruption, 
patronage and clientelism levels similar to or lower than Northern countries when at similar 
stages of development (Hopper, 2016).  Major anticorruption organisations (particularly the 
WB, UN, IMF, OECD, and Transparency International) portray it as a noble cause rectifiable 
through accounting technologies such as IFMSs, developing more professional accountants, 
adopting and applying IASs, and enacting a strong legal framework to support modern 
accounting practices. This presumes that corruption causes poverty but causality may flow in 
                                                          
23 Development characteristics include strong central state authority and systems; political stability; all classes 
being taxable; regulated and disciplined labour; protection of the poor; a sense of nation and nationalism; and 
attracting domestic and foreign capital that promotes national development goals. 
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the opposite direction (Everett, 2012). Neo-liberalism is just as conducive to corruption and 
whether poor governance is a cause or product of poverty is debatable. Development 
economists argue that increasing trade and markets to raise income levels will bring 
improved governance, and are sceptical of claims that neopatrimonialism impedes 
development. If this is the case, promoting conventional accounting reforms in DCs that 
serve economic ends have merit. However, other development experts argue that poor 
governance hinders development, which is not merely an economic phenomenon, hence the 
need for alternative accountings in areas like CSR and civil society involvement (Hopper, 
2016). This debate within development studies is highly pertinent to determining the best 
shape of accounting reforms in DCs. 
Accounting and financial reform to aid development does not stop at the doors of poor 
countries. Globalisation has precipitated a “race‐to‐the‐bottom” between nations seeking to 
provide off-shore centres to the advantage of major businesses. Major accounting firms and a 
network of advisers play a key role here (Sikka, 2008). The opaqueness of many MNCs’ 
finances is partly attributable to policies and practices in rich countries, particularly the 
deregulation policies of the last three decades. However, financial secrecy contributes to 
global market instability to the detriment of rich and poor countries alike but the loss in DCs 
can be immense. Illicit flows from DCs attributable to manipulation of cross-border invoices, 
non-arm’s length pricing, financial secrecy – particularly in offshore financial centres, and a 
general lack of financial transparency have weakened DCs’ economies to the benefit of richer 
countries (Cobham & McNair, 2012). The losses could finance development and outstrip 
current aid; losses also weaken governance, and promote corruption and poor governance. 
Moreover, Northern accounting (and accountants) and transnational institutions give an 
ambivalent message about accounting’s role: it is deemed unproblematic and a de facto part 
of the solution but it can enable as well as constrain corrupt practices (Everett et al., 2007). 
For example, the Bush Administration's neo-liberal agenda in Iraq created a corrupt, lawless 
environment where corporations could reap huge profits through malfeasance. Audit reports 
from the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction suggested that 
laissez-faire policies were innocent mistakes and that failures were independent of one 
another, and it reconstructed corporate malfeasance as waste, whilst criminalising low-level 
employees, and blaming government agencies, the war and Iraqis for fraudulent activities 
(Chwastiak, 2013).  
Northern academic researchers also have a responsibility to DCs. Governments and 
academics in DCs, in their desire to gain funding and status (whether for research, capacity-
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building, development or student recruitment), often mirror research policies of Northern 
institutions (Altbach & Knight, 2007; Marginson, 2006). For instance, journal rankings such 
as the ABS (UK Association of Business Schools), the ABDC (Australian Business Dean 
Councils) and the FNEGE (French Fondation Nationale pour l’Enseignement de la Gestion 
de l’Entreprise) have ‘travelled’ to DCs and their business schools rely on these for appraisal 
and promotion purposes (Altbach, 2004). This can lead academics to align themselves with 
research approaches and themes that are peripheral if not irrelevant to development priorities 
of DCs. For example, academics in many Asian economies are incentivised to publish in 
highly ranked US-based journals and consequently they often use US data to enhance their 
publication chances. Even when local academics use local data they must still meet 
institutional pressures to publish in highly ranked international accounting (primarily 
Northern) journals (Gul et al., 2013; Teoh & Zhang, 2011) that can be ignorant or 
unsympathetic to research issues and problems in DCs. Given the scarcity of accounting 
researchers in DCs, this wastes an important resource. Moreover, English has become the 
dominant if not unique language of research worldwide (Komori, 2015; Marginson, 2006) 
which denies access to non-English speaking scholars, reinforces Anglophone orientations, 
and deflects attention from work in indigenous languages or that of former colonisers: 
assistance with translation remains a neglected but important issue.  
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